Quantum key distribution over probabilistic quantum repeaters is addressed. We compare, under practical assumptions, two such schemes in terms of their secure key generation rates per quantum memory. The two schemes under investigation are the one proposed by Duan et al. in [Nat. 414, 413 (2001)] and that of Sangouard et al. in [Phys. Rev. A 76, 050301 (2007)]. We consider various sources of imperfection in both protocols, such as nonzero double-photon probabilities at the sources, dark counts in detectors, and inefficiencies in the channel, photodetectors and memories. We also consider memory decay and dephasing processes in our analysis. For the latter system, we determine the maximum value of the double-photon probability beyond which secret-key distillation is not possible. We also find crossover distances for one nesting level to its subsequent one. We finally compare the two protocols in terms of their achievable secret key generation rates at their optimal settings. Our results specify regimes of operation where one system outperforms the other.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite all practical progress with quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] [2] [3] [4] , its implementation over long distances remains to be a daunting task. In conventional QKD protocols such as BB84 [5] , channel loss and detector noises set an upper bound on the achievable security distance [6] . In addition, the path loss results in an exponential decay of the secret key generation rate with distance. Both these issues can, in principle, be overcome if one implements entanglement-based QKD protocols [7, 8] over quantum repeater systems [9] [10] [11] [12] . This approach, however, is not without its own challenges. Quantum repeaters require quantum memory (QM) units that can interact with light and can store their states for sufficiently long times. Moreover, highly efficient quantum gates might be needed to perform two-qubit operations on these QMs [9] . The latter issue has been alleviated, to some extent, by introducing a novel technique by Duan, Lukin, Cirac and Zoller (DLCZ) [10] , in which initial entanglement distribution and swapping, thereafter, rely on probabilistic linear-optic operations. Since its introduction, the DLCZ idea has been extended and a number of new proposals have emerged [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . Such probabilistic schemes for quantum repeaters particularly find applications in QKD systems of mid-to-long distances, which makes them worthy of analytical scrutiny. This papers compares DLCZ with one of its favorite successors, [17] , which relies on single photon sources (termed SPS, hereafter). Using a general systemlevel approach, which encompasses many relevant physical sources of imperfections in both systems, we provide a realistic account of their performance in terms of their secret key generation rates per logical memory used. This measure not only quantifies performance, but it also accounts for possible costs of implementation.
The SPS protocol attempts to resolve one of the key drawbacks in the original DLCZ protocol: multi-photon emissions. DLCZ uses atomic ensembles as QMs, which lend themselves to multi-photon emissions. This leads to obtaining not-fully-entangled states, hence resulting in lower key rates when used for QKD. To tackle this issue, in the SPS protocol, entanglement is distributed by ideally generating single photons, which will either be stored in QMs, or directed toward a measurement site. Whereas, in principle, the SPS protocol should not deal with the multi-photon problem, in practice, it is challenging to build ondemand single photon sources that do not produce any multi-photon components. A fair comparison between the two systems is only possible when one considers different sources of non-idealities in both cases, as we will pursue in this paper.
The SPS protocol is one of the many proposed schemes for probabilistic quantum repeaters. In [18] , authors provide a review of all such schemes and compare them in terms of the average time that it takes to generate entangled states, of a certain fidelity, between two remote memories. Their conclusion is that in the limit of highly efficient memories and detectors, the top three protocol are the SPS protocol and two others that rely on entangled/two photon sources [14, 16] . In more practical regimes, however, the SPS protocol seems to have the best performance per memory/mode used. In this paper, we therefore focus on the SPS protocol, and will investigate, under practical assumptions, whether the above conclusion remains valid in the context of QKD systems.
Our work is distinct from previous related work in its focusing on the performance of QKD systems over quantum repeaters. In [18] , authors have adopted the general measure of fidelity to find the average time of entanglement generation. Whereas their approach provides us with a general insight into some aspects of quantum repeater systems, it cannot be directly applied to the case of QKD. In the latter, the performance is not only a function of the entanglement generation rate, but also the quantum bit error rate caused by using nonideal entangled states. To include both these issues, here, we adopt the secret-key generation rate per memory as the main figure of merit, by which we can specify the optimal setting of the system and its performance in different regimes of operation.
Another key feature of our work is to use a normalized figure of merit to compare the DLCZ and SPS protocols. In practice, to obtain a sufficiently large key rate in such probabilistic systems, one must use multiple memories and/or modes in parallel. In order to account for the cost of the system, in our analysis, we provide a normalized key rate per memory and/or mode. We calculate the dependence of the secret key generation rate on different system parameters when resolving or non-resolving detectors are used. In particular, we find the optimal values for relevant system parameters if loss, double-photon emissions and dark counts are considered. Moreover, we account for the dephasing and the decay of memories in our analysis, which, we believe, is unprecedented.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we review the DLCZ and the SPS protocols, their entanglement distribution and swapping schemes, as well as their QKD measurements.
In Sec. III, we present our methodology for calculating the secret key generation rate for the SPS protocol, followed by numerical results in Sec. IV. We draw our conclusions in Sec.
V.

II. TWO PROBABILISTIC SCHEMES FOR QUANTUM REPEATERS
In this section we will review two probabilistic schemes, namely, DLCZ and SPS, for quantum repeaters. We describe the multiple-memory setup for such systems and model relevant system components.
A. DLCZ entanglement-distribution scheme
The DLCZ scheme works as follows; see Fig. 1(a) . Ensemble memories A and B, at distance L, are made of atoms with Λ-level configurations. They are all initially in their ground states. By coherently pumping these atoms, some of them may undergo off-resonant Raman transitions that produce Stokes photons. The resulting photons are sent toward a 50:50 beam splitter located at distance L/2 between A and B. If, ideally, only one photon has been produced in total at the ensembles, one and, at most, only one of the detectors in Fig. 1(a) clicks. In such a case, the DLCZ protocol heralds A and B to be ideally in one of the Bell state |ψ ± AB = (|10 AB ± |01 AB ) / √ 2, where |0 J is the ensemble ground state and
J is the symmetric collective excited state of ensemble J = A, B, where S † J is the corresponding creation operator [10] . An important feature of such collective excitations is that they can be read out by converting their states into photonic states.
The fundamental source of error in the DLCZ scheme is the multiple-excitation effect, where more than one Stokes photon are produced [11] . If the probability of generating one Stokes photon is denoted by p c , there is a probability p 2 c that each ensemble emits one photon. If this happens, a click on one of the two detectors heralds entanglement generation, whereas the memories are in the separable state |11 AB .
In practice, one has to find the right balance between the heralding probability, which increases with p c , and the quantum bit error rate (QBER), which also increases with p c . In [11] , authors find the optimal value of p c that maximizes the secret key generation rate in various scenarios when photon-number resolving detectors (PNRDs) or non-resolving photon detectors (NRPDs) are used. In this paper, we use their results in our comparative study. 
B. SPS entanglement-distribution scheme
The SPS protocol, proposed in [17] , aims at reducing multi-photon errors and, in particular, terms of the form |11 AB by using single-photon sources. The architecture of this scheme is presented in Fig. 1(b) . The two remote parties each have one single-photon source and one memory. In the ideal scenario, each source produces exactly one photon on demand, and these photons are sent through identical beam splitters with transmission coefficients η.
It can be shown that the state shared by the QMs after a single click on one of the detectors in Fig. 1(b) is given by [17] 
which has our desired entangled state plus a vacuum component. The latter, at the price of reducing the rate, can be selected out once the above state is measured at later stages [10, 11] .
In a practical setup, several sources of imperfection must be considered in Fig. 1(b) .
First, most known techniques for generating single photons suffer from multiple-photon emissions. That includes single-photon sources that rely on parametric down-conversion [19, 20] , quasi-atomic structures such as quantum dots [21] , or the partial memory-readout technique described in [18] . In all cases, there is a nonzero probability to generate more than one photon, which manifests itself in producing nonzero values for second-order coherence functions [19, 20] . For practical purposes, however, it is often sufficient to consider the effect of two-photon states, as we will do, in this paper. It turns out that this approximation is particularly valid for the systems of interest in this paper. One should also consider nonidealities in QMs. In our analysis, we account for reading and writing efficiencies of QMs, as well as their decay and dephasing processes. We assume that QMs can store multiple excitations.
Throughout the paper, we assume that both setups in Fig. 1 are symmetric and phase stabilized. Furthermore, all conditions required for a proper quantum interference at 50-50 beam splitters are assumed to be met. Recent experimental progress in QKD shows that it is indeed possible to achieve these conditions [22, 23] .
C. Entanglement swapping and QKD measurements
Figure 2(a) shows the entanglement swapping setup for the DLCZ and the SPS protocols.
Entanglement is established between QM pairs AA ′ and B ′ B using either of protocols.
A partial Bell-state measurement (BSM) on photons retrieved from the middle QMs A After generating entangled pairs over a distance L, Alice and Bob retrieve the states of memories and perform a QKD measurement on the resulting photons. They apply a random relative phase shift, ϕ, of either 0 or π/2, between their two fields. They will later, at the sifting stage, only keep data points where the same phase value is used by both parties.
They then turn their sifted keys into a secure key by using privacy amplification and error reconciliation techniques. Eavesdroppers can be detected by following the BBM92 or the Ekert protocol [7, 24] .
As mentioned in Sec. I, previous analyses only provide the fidelity or the time required for a successful creation of an entangled state [17] . Instead, in Sec. III, we will calculate the secret key generation rate for the SPS scheme and compare it with that of the DLCZ protocol reported in [11] . At any such cycle, we also match up entangled pairs at different stations to perform Bell-state measurements (BSMs). (b) A quantum repeater with multimode memories. In each round, we apply our entanglement distribution scheme on all M modes, until one of them becomes entangled. BSM will be followed as soon as entanglement is established on both sides.
D. Multiple-memory configuration
In order to compare different quantum repeater setups, we consider the multiple-memory configuration shown in Fig. 4 (a) along with the cyclic protocol described in [25, 26] . In this protocol, in every cycle of duration L 0 /c, where L 0 is the length of the shortest segment in a quantum repeater, and c is the speed of light in the channel, we try to entangle any unentangled pairs of memories at distance L 0 . We assume our entanglement-distribution protocol succeeds with probability P S (L 0 ). At each cycle, we also perform as many BSMs as possible at the intermediate nodes. The main requirement for such a protocol is that, at the stations that we perform BSMs, we must be aware of establishment of entanglement over links of length l/2 before extending it to l (informed BSMs). We use the results of [25] to calculate the generation rate of entangled states per memory in the limit of infinitely many
M , i = 1...n, is the BSM success probability at nesting level i for a quantum repeater with n nesting levels.
We use the following procedure, in forthcoming sections, to find the secret key generation rate of the setup in Fig. 4(a) . For each entanglement distribution scheme, we find P S (L 0 ) and relevant P M probabilities to derive R ent (L) . We then find the sifted key generation rate by multiplying R ent (L) by the probability, P click , that an acceptable click pattern occurs upon QKD measurements. Finally, the ratio between the number of secure bits and the sifted key bits is calculated using the Shor-Preskill lower bound [27] . In the limit of an infinitely long key, the secret key generation rate per logical memory is lower bounded by
where ǫ Q denotes the QBER, and
E. Multimode-memory configuration
Another way to speed up the entanglement generation rate is via using multimode memories [15, 28] . As can be seen in Fig. 4 (b), in this setup, we only use one physical memory per node but each memory is capable of storing multiple modes. In each round, we attempt to entangle memories at distance L 0 by entangling, at least, one of the existing M modes.
Once this occurs, we stop entanglement generation on that leg and wait until a BSM can be performed. For readout, all modes must be retrieved in order to perform BSMs or QKD measurements on particular modes of interest. In effect, this scheme is similar to that of n R ent (L) [18, 26] .
In our forthcoming analysis, we only consider the case of Fig. 4 (a), but our results are extensible to the case of Fig. 4(b) by accounting for the relevant prefactor.
F. Memory decay and dephasing
Quantum memories are expected to decay and dephase while storing quantum states.
In this paper, we model these two processes independently. The decay process, with a time constant T 1 , can be absorbed in the retrieval efficiency of memories. If the retrieval efficiency immediately after writing into the memory is given by η 0 , after a storage time T , the retrieval efficiency is given by η c = η 0 exp(−T /T 1 ). Different memories in the multiplememory setup of Fig. 4 (a) undergo different decay times. In our analysis, we consider the worst case scenario where all memories have decayed for T = L/c, which is only applicable to the far-end memories. Under this assumption, η c can be treated as a constant at all stages of entanglement swapping.
We model the memory dephasing via a dephasing channel, by which the probability of dephasing after a period T is given by e d = [1 − exp(−T /T 2 )]/2. In the context of the QKD protocol in Fig. 3 , this phase error is equivalent to the misalignment error in a conventional polarization-based BB84 protocol and has mostly the same effect. In our analysis, we neglect the effect of dephasing at the middle stages, and only consider its effect on the far-end memories used for the QKD protocol. Again, for the multiple-memory setup of Fig. 4(a) , the relevant storage time is given by T = L/c [25] .
III. SPS SECRET KEY GENERATION RATE
In this section, the secure key generation rate for the SPS scheme proposed in [17] is calculated. As was shown in section II, this scheme relies on simultaneous generation of single photons in two remote sites. Most practical schemes for the generation of single photons, however, suffer from the possibility of multiple-photon emissions. To address this issue, in this section, we consider non-ideal photon sources with nonzero probabilities for two-photon emissions, and find the secret key generation rate in the repeater and no-repeater cases.
Suppose our photon sources emit one photon with probability 1 −p and two photons with probability p. We, therefore, have the following input density matrix for the initial state of l and r sources in Fig. 5 (a)
where
As we will show later, in a practical regime of operation, p ≪ 1; hence, in our following analysis, we neglect O (p 2 ) terms corresponding to the simultaneous emission of two photons by both sources. 
A. No-repeater case
In this section, we describe how we obtain parameters P S , P click , and R QKD for the setup in Fig. 5 (a) and QKD measurements as in Fig. 3 . In our analysis, we use an equivalent setup, as shown in Fig. 5(b) , where beam splitters have been rearranged such that η t η D = η m η d . We can then recognize similar building blocks, which we referred to by butterfly modules, in Fig. 5(b) . A butterfly module, as shown in Fig. 6 , is a two-input two-output building block consisting of three beam splitters. For an input state ρ L ′ R ′ in Fig. 6 , we denote the output state on ports L and R by
We use well-known models for beam splitters [29] to find output density matrices for input states to a generic butterfly module. In Appendix A, we find the relevant inputoutput relationships for the states of interest. We use Maple 15 to simplify some of our analytical results. We can then find, ρ ALBR , the joint state of the memories and the optical modes entering detectors L and R in Fig. 5(b) by applying the butterfly operation three times, as follows
According to the SPS protocol, a click on exactly one of the detectors L or R, in Fig For example, for a click on detector L, the explicit form of the measurement operator is given by
where I L denotes the identity operator for the mode entering the left detector [30] , and d c is the dark-count rate per gate width per detector.
After the measurement, the resulting joint state, ρ AB , of quantum memories is given by:
is the probability that the conditioning event M occurs. The last equality is due to the symmetry assumption.
For QKD measurements, we assume two pairs of memories, A-B and C-D, are given in an initial state similar to that of Eq. (7). We use the scheme described in Fig. 3 to perform QKD measurements. For simplicity, we assume both users use zero phase shifts; other cases can be similarly worked out in our symmetric setup. In Fig. 3 , the retrieval efficiency and the quantum detectors efficiency are represented by fictitious beam splitters with, respectively, transmission coefficient η c and η D . It is again possible to remodel the setup in Fig. 3 as shown in Fig. 2(b) , and use the butterfly operation B 0.5,ηs , where η s = η c η D . The density matrix right before photodetection in Fig. 3 is then given by B 0.5,ηs (B 0.5,ηs (ρ AB ⊗ ρ CD )) ,
where one of the B-operators is applied to modes A and C, and the other one to modes B and D. Using this state, we find P click and ǫ Q as outlined in Appendix B.
Using Eq. (2), the secure key generation rate per memory, R QKD , in the no-repeater setup, is then lower bounded by [11] :
where P S (L) 2L/c , given by Eq. (8), is the generation rate of entangled pairs per logical memory P click is the probability of creating a sifted key bit by using two entangled pairs, and [1 − 2 H(ǫ Q )] is the probability of creating a secure key bit out of each sifted key bit. Here, we assume a biased basis choice to avoid an extra factor of two reduction in the rate [31] . The full definition for P click is given by Eq. (B3). The QBER,
where P error is the probability that Alice and Bob assign different bits to their sifted keys, is given by Eq. (B4).
B. Repeater case
First, consider the repeater setup of nesting level one in Fig. 2(a) . We use the structure of Fig. 5(a) to distribute entanglement between A-A ′ and B ′ -B memories. The initial joint state of the system, ρ AA ′ BB ′ = ρ AA ′ ⊗ ρ BB ′ , can then be found, using Eq. (7), as described in the previous section. We then apply a BSM by reading memories A ′ and B ′ and interfering the resulting optical modes at a 50:50 beam splitter. Success is declared if exactly one of the detectors in Fig. 2(a) clicks. This can be modeled by applying measurement operators in Eq. (6), which results in
, where L and R represent the input modes to the photodetectors. Note that, in Fig. 2 , the detectors have ideal unity quantum efficiencies. Moreover,
is the probability that only the left detector clicks in the BSM module of Fig. 2 . A click on the right detector has the same probability by symmetry.
In order to find the secret key generation rate, we will follow similar steps to the norepeater case. That is, we apply the butterfly operation to find relevant density matrices, from which P click and ǫ Q can be obtained. From Eq. (2), in the one-node repeater case, R QKD is lower bounded by
Using the same approach, and by using Eq. (2), we find the secret key generation rate for higher nesting levels. The details of which, have, however, been omitted for the sake of brevity.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results for the secret key generation rate of the SPS protocol, versus different system parameters, in the no-repeater and repeater cases, and we compare them with that of the DLCZ protocol. As mentioned earlier, we have used Maple 15 to analytically derive expressions for Eqs. (2), (9), and (13) when PNRDs or NRPDs are used. Unless otherwise noted, we use the nominal values summarized in Table I for all the results presented in this section.
A. SPS key rate versus system parameters 1. Source transmission coefficient Figure 7 shows the secret key generation rate per memory, R QKD , versus the source transmission coefficient η in Fig. 1(b) , at p = 0.001 and L = 250 km. It can be seen that there exist optimal values of η for both repeater and no-repeater systems. Table II summarizes these optimum values for different nesting levels. The optimal value of η for the Table I no-repeater system is higher than the repeater ones, and that is because of the additional entanglement swapping steps in the latter systems. Another remarkable feature in Fig. 7 is that the penalty of using NRPDs, versus PNRDs, seems to be minor at p = 10 The existence of an optimal value for η arises from a competition between the probability of entanglement distribution P S , which grows with η, and P click , which decreases with η.
This has been demonstrated in the inset of Fig. 7 . The latter issue is mainly because of the vacuum component in Eq. (1) . In the case of the repeater system, P M also decreases with η for the same reason, and that is why the optimal value of η is lower for repeater systems.
The optimum values of η in Fig. 7 are interestingly almost identical to the value of η that minimizes the total time for a successful creation of an entangled state, as prescribed in [17] . Tables I and II. It is because, at a fixed distance, the QBER term in Eqs. (9) and (13) is mainly a function of the double-photon probability and the dark count rate, and it does not considerably vary with η. More generally, the optimum values of η remain constant as in Table II so long as the error terms are well below the cut-off threshold in QKD.
2. Nesting levels and crossover distance Figure 8 depicts the normalized secret key generation rate versus distance for different nesting levels. At d c = 0, the slope advantage, proportional to P S (L/2 n ), for higher nesting levels is clear in the figure. Because of additional entanglement swapping stages, the nopath-loss rate at L = 0 is, however, lower for higher nesting levels. That would result in crossover distances-at which one system outperforms another-once we move from one nesting level to its subsequent one. The crossover distance has architectural importance and will specify the optimum distance between repeater nodes.
The crossover distance is a function of various system parameters. As shown in the inset of Fig. 8 , positive dark count rates can considerably change the crossover distance. By including dark counts in our analysis, there will be a cutoff security distance for each nesting level. By increasing the dark count rate, these cutoff distances will decrease and become closer to each other. That would effectively reduce the crossover distance. At dark count rates as high as d c = 10 −6 , the superiority of 3 over 2 nesting levels at long distances would almost diminish as they both have almost the same cutoff distances.
The crossover distance will decrease if component efficiencies go up. This has been shown in Fig. 9 when the crossover distance is depicted versus measurement efficiency. The latter directly impacts the BSM success probability, P M , and that is why the larger its value the lower the crossover distance. Larger values of η m also reduce the vacuum component, thus enhancing the chance of success at the entanglement swapping stage.
It can be noted in Fig. 9 that, even for highly efficient devices, the optimum distance between repeater nodes would tend to lie at around 150-200 km. For instance at L = 1000 km, and with the nominal values used in this paper, the optimum nesting level is 2, which implies that the distance between two nodes of the repeater is 250 km. This could be a long distance for practical purposes, such as for phase stabilization, and that might require us to work at a suboptimal distancing. The latter would further reduce the secret key generation rate. Our result is somehow different from what is reported in [18, 26] , albeit one should bear in mind the different set of assumptions and measures used therein. All graphs are at L = 250 km.
Double-photon probability
Figures 10 show the secret key generation rate for the SPS protocol, at the optimal values of η listed in Table II , versus the double-photon probability p in the no-repeater and repeater cases. It can be seen that, in both cases, there exists a cutoff probability at which R QKD becomes zero. This point corresponds to the threshold QBER of 11% from the Shor-Preskill security proof. In the case of QMs with sufficiently long coherence times, as is the case in Fig. 10 , the QBER in our system stems from two factors: dark count and double-photon probability. The former is proportional to d c /η d and it comes into effect only when the path loss is significant. The latter, however, affects the QBER at all distances. To better see this issue, in Fig. 10(b) , the cutoff probability is depicted versus the dark count rate. It can be seen that the cutoff probability linearly goes down with d c , which confirms the additive contribution of dark counts and two-photon emissions to the QBER.
The cutoff probability at d c = 0 deserves a particular attention. As can be seen in Fig. 10(b) , for the no-repeater system, the maximum allowed value of p is about 0.028 for PNRDs and 0.026 for NRPDs. This implies that the QBER in this case, at d c = 0, is roughly given by 4p. This can be verified by finding the contributions from two-and singlephoton components in Eq. (4). We can then show that the QBER, at the optimal value of η in Table II, Tables I and II . QBER. Considering that four pairs of entangled states is now needed, and that the chance of making an error for an unentangled pair is typically 1/2, the QBER is roughly given by 4×2×3(1+η)p/2 ≈ 16p, which implies that, to the first-order approximation, the maximum allowed value for p is about 0.11/16 = 0.0068. Figure 10 (a) confirms this result, where the cutoff probability is about 0.0056 for the PNRDs and 0.0054 for the NRPDs, corresponding
With a similar argument as above, one may roughly expect a factor of 4-to-5 increase in the QBER for each additional nesting level. This implies that for a repeater system with nesting level 3, we should expect a QBER around 500p just because of the double-photon emission. Table III confirms our approximation by providing the actual cutoff figures for different nesting levels. We discuss the practical implications of this finding later in this section.
Memory dephasing
Figure 11(a) shows the secret key generation rate per memory for the SPS protocol with NRPDs versus distance for two different values of the dephasing time, T 2 , at p = 10 −3 . It is clear that, by reducing the coherence time, the security distance drops to shorter distances.
Whereas, at T 2 = 100 ms, the key rate remains the same as that of Fig. 8(b) , at T 2 = 10 ms, both repeater and non-repeater systems would fall short of supporting distances over 360 km. that the maximum distance supported by our protocol is about cT 2 /4. To be operating on the flat region in the curves shown in Fig. 11(b) , one even requires a higher coherence time.
In other words, the minimum required coherence time to support a link of length L is on the order of 10L/c. This is in line with findings in [25] . Although not explicitly shown here, the same requirements are expected to be as well applicable to other QKD systems that rely on quantum repeaters. Figure 12 compares the secret key generation rate for the SPS protocol, found in this paper, with that of the DLCZ protocol as obtained in [11] . In both systems, we have assumed d c = 0. All other parameters are as in Table I . In both systems, we use the optimal setting in the PNRD case. The conclusion would be similar if one uses NRPDs, as seen in all numerical results presented in this paper. For the SPS protocol, the optimal setting corresponds to the values of η in Table II . In the DLCZ protocol, the adjustable parameter is the excitation probability p c . Note that, whereas in the SPS protocol, the rate decreases monotonically with p, in the DLCZ protocol, it peaks at a certain value of p c . That is because, in the SPS protocol, we use an on-demand source of photons, whereas in the DLCZ protocol, the heralding probability as well as the relative double-photon probability are both proportional to p c . The optimum value for the excitation probability is given by p c = 0.0243 in the no-repeater case and p c = 0.0060 in the one-node repeater case [11] . Note that the Comparison between the DLCZ and SPS protocols using PNRDs. For both systems, the better of repeater or non-repeater system is used. Both systems operate at their optimal setting: For the SPS protocol, the optimum value of η is used; for the DLCZ protocol, the optimum value of p c is used.
B. SPS versus DLCZ
By varying the double-photon probability, p, in the SPS protocol, we find that the maximum p at which SPS outperforms DLCZ is around p = 0.004. In all curves, d c = 0. All other parameters are taken from Tables I and II. analysis in [11] accounts for all multi-excitation components in the initial state of the system.
In all curves in Fig. 12 , we have used the better of the repeater and no repeater systems at each distance. Our results show that the SPS protocol offers a higher key rate per memory than the DLCZ for on-demand single-photon sources with double-photon probabilities of 0.004 or lower. The advantage is however below one order of magnitude in most cases.
A key assumption in the results obtained above is the use of on-demand sources in the SPS protocol. The less-than one-order-of-magnitude difference between the two protocols can then be easily washed away if one uses single-photon sources with less than roughly 50%
efficiencies. This means that the conventional methods for generating single photons, such as parametric downconversion or quantum dots, may not yet be useful in the SPS protocol.
The partial memory-readout technique could, still, be a viable solution. In this scheme, we drive a Raman transition, as in the DLCZ protocol, in an atomic ensemble, such that with some probability p a Stokes photon is released. If we detect such a photon, then we are left with an ensemble, which can be partially read out with probability η to resemble the first part of the SPS protocol. One should, however, note that with limitations on the cutoff probability to be on the order of 10 −4 -10 −5 , it may take quite a long time to prepare such a source-memory pair. For instance, if the required p is 10 −4 , and the efficiency of the collection and detection setup is 0.1, even if we run the driving pulse at a 1 GHz rate, it takes on average 0.1 ms to prepare the initial state. This time is comparable to the time that it takes for light to travel 100 km, which is on the same order of magnitude that we run our cyclic protocol in Fig. 4(a) . Considering a particular setup paramters, it is not then an obvious call to which of the DLCZ or SPS protocols performs better, and that underlines the importance of our theoretical analysis.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the SPS protocol proposed in [17] in terms of the secret key generation rate that it could offer in a QKD-over-repeater setup. This protocol belongs to a family of probabilistic quantum repeaters, and perhaps one of their best, inspired by the DLCZ proposal [10] . Our aim was to compare the SPS protocol, for QKD applications, with the original DLCZ protocol, as reported in [11] , in a realistic scenario. To this end, we considered various sources of imperfections in our analysis and obtained the optimal regime of operation as a function of system parameters. We accounted for double-photon probabilities at the source and realized that, under Shor-Preskill's security-proof assumptions, its value should not exceed 0.11/4, in a direct-link scenario, and 0.11/20 in a one-node repeater case.
We would expect the same scaling, if not worse, at higher nesting levels, which implied that for a repeater setup of nesting level 3, the double-photon probability must be on the order of 10 −4 or lower. That would be a challenging requirement for on-demand single-photon sources needed in the SPS protocol. Under above circumstances, the advantage of the SPS protocol over the DLCZ would be marginal and would not exceed one order of magnitude of key rate in bit/s per memory. In our analysis, we also accounted for memory dephasing and dark counts. Our results showed that the minimum required coherence time for a link of length L is roughly given by 4L/c, where c is the speed of light in the channel. The crossover distance at which we have to move up the nesting-level ladder varies for different system parameters. The optimum distancing between repeater nodes can nevertheless be typically as high as 150 km to 200 km depending on the measurement efficiency among other parameters. We noticed that, within practical regimes of operation, there would only be a minor advantage in using resolving photodetectors over more conventional threshold detectors. We emphasized that, because of using a normalized figure of merit in our analysis, our results would be applicable to multi-memory and/or -mode scenarios. where J = L ′ and K = R ′ for input number states and J = L and K = R for output number states in Fig. 6 . bra state is different from the ket state, from the output state.
Appendix B: Derivation of P click and P error
In this Appendix, we find the gain and the QBER for the QKD scheme of Fig. 3 . Let us assume that the memory pairs AB and CD are already entangled via the no-repeater or the one-node repeater scheme described in Sec. III. In the case of SPS protocol, their state is, respectively, given by Eqs. (7) and (11) . The density matrix right before photodetection in Fig. 3 is then given by ρ ABCD = B 0.5,ηs (B 0.5,ηs (ρ AB ⊗ ρ CD )) , where one of the B-operators is applied to modes A and C, and the other one to modes B and D. Using Table A , we can calculate the exact form of ρ ABCD , as we have done in this paper.
The most general measurement on the modes entering the photodetectos of Fig. 3 , namely,
A, B, C, and D, can be written in terms of the following measurement operators:
for PNRDs, where a, b, c, d = 0, 1 and |k K represents a Fock state for the optical mode K = A, B, C, D. In the case of NRPDs, we only need to replace |1 KK 1| with (I K − |0 KK 0| ), where I K is the identity operator for mode K.
Similarly, we can define the corresponding probabilities to the above measurement operators as follows
The explicit forms for P click and P error are then given by
and
where e d is the dephasing (misalignment) error, and
(1 − d c ) 2 (P 1100 + P 0011 + d c (P 1000 + P 0100 + P 0010 + P 0001 ) + 2d (2 − d c )(P 1000 + P 0100 + P 0010 + P 0001 ) + 
is the probability that Alice and Bob assign identical bits to their raw keys if there is no misalignment, and
(1 − d c ) 2 (P 1001 + P 0110 + d c (P 1000 + P 0100 + P 0010 + P 0001 ) + 2d 2 c P 0000 ), PNRD 
is the probability that they make an erroneous bit assignment in the absence of misalignment.
